Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:Earmarked Taxation: Welfare versus Political Support
Author-Name: Boes, Dieter
Classification-JEL:H21, D82
Keywords: 	 
	 Earmarking, Efficient Taxation, Asymmetric Information
Abstract:	Compared with the traditional public-finance 
	approach of a monolithic fully informed planner,
	earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal 
	if a principal-agent setting is considered, where taxing and
	spending are performed by two separate agents which 
	are monitored by the parliament. We assume that the
	parliament either maximizes welfare or expected votes. 
	Vote maximizers are more inclined to choose
	earmarking, but at the price of inefficiently high costs.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 
Revision-Date: 1999-04
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:594
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa594.pdf
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File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa594.ps
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