Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces
Author-Name: Oechssler, Joerg 
Author-Name: Frank Riedel
Classification-JEL: C70, C72
Keywords: replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability, continuous strategy
	spaces
Abstract: The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to
	finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this unsatisfying
	restriction is unnecessary. We specify a simple condition under which
	the
	continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for the case of
	infinte
	strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide new conditions for the
	stability of
	rest points and show that even strict equilibria may be unstable.
	Finally, we
	apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash
	demand
	game, the War of Attrition, linear-quadratic games, the harvest
	preemption
	game, and games with mixed strategies.
Length: 31 pages
Creation-Date: 1999-11
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:606
File-URL:http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa606.pdf   
File-Format: application/pdf