Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:Learning to signal in markets
Author-Name:N&oumlldeke, Georg 
Author-Name: Larry Samuelson
Classification-JEL:C70, C72, D82, D83
Keywords:
Abstract:We formulate a dynamic learning-and-adjustment model of a market in which sellers choose signals that
	potentially reveal their types. If the dynamic process selects a unique limiting outcome, then that outcome must be an
	undefeated equilibrium; though to be undefeated does not suffice to be the sole limiting outcome. If a Riley outcome exists that
	provides "high" type sellers with a higher utility than any other equilibrium outcome, then that outcome is the unique limiting
	outcome of our model. In the absence of a Riley outcome, or if high type workers obtain higher utility in a pooling equilibrium
	than in the Riley outcome, a unique limit outcome will only emerge under very stringent conditions. If these conditions fail,
	the market will cycle between various equilibria and, possibly, nonequilibrium outcomes
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1994
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:271