Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution
Author-Name: Schlag, Karl H.
Classification-JEL:C79 
Keywords: Random matching, learning, imitation, replicator dynamics
Abstract:In consectutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is randomly matched, obtains a payoff
	and then observes the performance of another agent. An agent determines future behavior based on the information she
	receives from the present round. She chooses among the behavioral rules that increase expected payoffs in any specifications
	of the matching scenario. The rule that outperforms all other such rules specifies to imitate the action of an agent that
	performed better with probability proportional to how much better she performed. The evolution of a large population in
	which each agent uses this rule can be approximated in the short run by the replicator dynamics. 
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1994-11
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:296
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb296.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size:381032 bytes