Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result.
Author-Name: Karl H. Schlag
Author-WorkPlace-Name: Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung III, UniversitŁt
  	Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
Author-Email: schlag@glider.econ3.uni-bonn.de
Abstract: A partnership game is a two person game in which both players
  	necessarily receive the same payoff. For symmetric partnership games
  	it is shown that asymptotic stability with respect to the replicator
  	dynamics, evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith and Price [1973],
  	Thomas [1985]) and equilibrium evolutionary stability (Swinkels
  	[1992]) are equivalent concepts. This equivalence result is also
  	derived for asymmetric partnership games, both in the asymmetric
  	contest (Selten[1980]) and in the two population setting (Balkenborg
  	and Schlag [1994]). A side result shows for general games that
  	equilibrium evolutionary stability is weaker than evolutionary
  	stability.
Keywords: Evolutionarily stable set, strict equilibrium set, equilibrium
  	evolutionarily stable, local efficiency, replicator dynamics,
  	asymptotic stability, minimal attracting set.
Classification-JEL: C79
Series: SFB Discussion Paper
Number: 298
Creation-Date: 1994-12
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb298.ps
File-Format: Application/PostScript
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:298