Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:Central Bank Independence and Seigniorage: The Banque de France
Author-Name: Wesche, Katrin 
Author-Name: Jens Weidmann
Classification-JEL:E42, E58
Keywords:Central Bank Independence, Seigniorage, Banque de France
Abstract:One prominent characteristic of independent central bank is the legal limitation of the central bank's
	lending to the government. Although a priori we expect a strong link between the legal restriction on central bank
	credit to the government and seigniorage, the empirical cross-country evidence in favour of this hypothesis is
	rather tenuous pointing to a poor compliance to these restrictions. On balance, these cross-section studies suggest
	that, though central bank independence is not a sufficient condition to avoid excessive expansion of the monetary
	base, at best it can be considered a necessary condition. In this paper we intend to supplement the cross-section
	evidence through a case study of regime changes in a single country. The case of France is particular interesting as
	the French monetary system was highly administered until 1985 when radical reforms were implemented. These
	events are reflected in the development of seigniorage revenue.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1995-02
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:307