Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:On the Interpretation of Evolutionary Stable Sets 
Author-Name: Balkenborg, Dieter
Author-Name: Karl H. Schlag
Classification-JEL:C79
Keywords:evolutionarily stable set, evolutionarily stable strategy, neutral stability, strict equilibrium, mixed
	strategy model, asymmetric contest
Abstract:We call a set of strategies "uniformly evolutionary stable" if the following holds after a small
	mutation of a monomorphic population playing a strategy in the set: a) No mutant strategy can spread. b)
	Mutant strategies not in the set will be driven out. c) The meaning of a "small mutation" can be chosen
	independently of both the mutant and the incumbent strategy. We consider our notion an intuitive extension of
	the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy. We show that our notion coincides with the notion of
	evolutionarily stable sets due to Thomas [22] in the case of bimatrix games, but it is stronger in general. As an
	application we study uniformly evolutionarily stable sets in truly asymmetric contest.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1996-07
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:313