Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Population Games
Author-Name: Balkenborg, Dieter
Author-Name: Karl H. Schlag
Classification-JEL:C79
Keywords: evolutionarily stable set, evolutionarily stable strategy, neutral stability, strict equilibrium, mixed
	strategy model, asymmetric contest
Abstract:We extend the notions of evolutionary stability and, for the first time, that of neutral stability to
	asymmetric games played between two populations. Stability with respect to simultaneous entry of a small
	proportion of mutants into both populations is considered. Allocations where neither mutant can ever spread
	are called neutrally stable. For bimatrix games, neutral stability in the asymmetric population game is found to
	be a weaker concept than neutral stability in the asymmetric contest. Moreover existence is guaranteed for 2 x 2
	bimatrix games. Sets of neutrally stable strategy pairs such that for any pair of mutants not in the set at least one
	mutant is driven out are called evolutionary stable. Evolutionarily stable sets are shown to be equivalent to strict
	equilibrium sets. Additionally, uniformity considerations are investigated.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1995-05
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:314
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb314.ps
File-Format: application/pdf
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