Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs How spatial evolution leads to enequality
Author-Name:Kirchkamp, Oliver
Classification-JEL: C72, D62, D63, R12, R13
Keywords:Evolutionary Game Theory, Networks
Abstract:We present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex
	networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are permanently matched. These players learn from
	the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by their partners. Thus, several features of
	spatial evolution are captured while nonlinearities that would arise with more complex networks are avoided. We can
	identify characteristics of evolution in networks such as stable cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games and long run
	exploitation among different strategies. We furthermore discuss evolution of repeated game strategies in this
	framework comparing synchonous models with asynchronous ones.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1995-10
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:329