Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Evolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction
  	Structure
Author-Name: Illan Eshel
Author-Name: Emilia Sansone
Author-Name: Avner Shaked
Abstract: A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is
  	presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Inter- action
  	neighborhood to obtain their payof. Individuals either imitate or
  	else  they die and are replaced by one of their neigh- bors in
  	another  neighborhood- the Propagation neighborhood. An individual
  	with a higher  payo  is more likely to be imitated or to replace his
  	neighbor.  An unbeatable strategy can repel the invasion of any
  	mutant.  We show that the (unique, if it exists) unbeatable strategy
  	is an  ESS of a population game with inclu- sive  tness parameter
  	which  depends on the size of the interac- tion and propagation
  	neighborhoods.  We analyze the evolution of altruistic traits in
  	such populations and  observe that allowing the players more
  	information eases the development of altruistic behavior.
Keywords: Population Dynamics, Isolation by Distance, Local Inter- action,
  	Altruism, Inclusive Fitness
Classification-JEL: C72; C79
Creation-Date: 1996-01
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb350.ps
File-Format: Application/Postscript
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:350