Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title: Spontaneous Behavior and Experienced Players' Strategies in Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Author-Name:Kuon, Bettina
Classification-JEL:C90, C92, C72, C78
Keywords: Bargaining, Incomplete Information, Experiments, Bounded Rationality
Abstract: Two players bargain over the allocation of a sum of money. They are only incompletely informed about the
	opponent's alternative in case of conflict. The paper investigates two different experimental approaches: the
	spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment and the strategies programmed by highly experienced
	subjects. The synopsis of these two experimental approaches is a novelty in experimental research and it provides a
	vivid picture of the boundedly rational behavior in the bargaining game. The paper's main focus is on the agreement
	outcomes, the average payoffs, the concession behavior and the individual adaption to experience.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1996-05
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:373