Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title: Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies
Author-Name:Kirchkamp, Oliver
Classification-JEL:C63, C72, D62, D63, D73, D83, R12, R13
Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Networks. 
Abstract: We study a model of local evolution. Players are located on a network and play games agains their
	neighbors. Players are characterized by three properties: (1) The stage game strategies they use agains their
	neighbors. (2) The repeated game strategy that determines the former. (3) A learning rule that selects the
	repeated game strategy, on the basis of the player's own and the neighbors' payoff and repeated game strategy.
	The dynamics that specifies learning rules is given exogenously. Players sample their neighbors' learning rules
	and their respective payoff. Then they construct a model that related parameters of the learning rules to
	payoffs. Given this model they choose an optimal learning rule.
	We find that under this dynamics learning rules emerge in the long run which behave deterministically but
	which are asymmetric in the sense that while learning they put more weight on the learning players experience
	then on the observed players one. Nevertheless stage game behavior under these learning rules is similar to
	behavior using symmetric learning rules.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1996-05
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:379
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb379.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 710475 bytes