Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title: A Learning Approach to Auctions
Author-Name: Monderer, Dov 
Author-Name: Shlomit Hon-Snir
Author-Name: Aner Sela
Classification-JEL: C72, C73, D83, D44
Keywords: 
Abstract: We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the
	first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or
	generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bid are in equilibrium in
	the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 1996-10
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:388