Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title: An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game
Author-Name:  Nagel, Rosemarie
Author-Name: Nicolaas J. Vriend
Classification-JEL: C7, C9, D8
Keywords: 	Extensive Form Games, Perfect Recall
Abstract: We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firms in the same
	market of a homogenous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The
	firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of
	information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information
	provided, the players do not have a well-specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to
	characterize the adaptive behavior of players in such a situation.
Length: pages
Creation-Date:1997-07 
Revision-Date:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:408