Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title: Fictitious Play in Coordination Games
Author-Name: Sela, Aner
Author-Name: Dorothea K. Herreiner
Classification-JEL: C72, D83
Keywords: Learning, Fictitious Play, Coordination Games, Pure Coordination Games	
Abstract: We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games
	for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play
	player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with
	unbounded recall are shown to coordinae (almost surely) against their own type as well as against players with
	bounded recall. This implies that a FP players's realized average utility is (almost surely) at least as large as his
	minmax payoffs in 2x2 coordination games.
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 
Revision-Date: 1997-12
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:423
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb423.pdf
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