Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0  
Title:Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games
Author-Name:  Hofbauer, Josef
Author-Name: Karl H. Schlag 
Classification-JEL: C72, C79 
Keywords: 	 single sampling, multiple sampling, improving, sequential proportional observation, replicator
	dynamics, aggregate monotone dynamics, Evolutionary Game Theory, Matching Pennies 
Abstract: Consider a large population of individuals that are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2x2
	game such as Matching Pennies with fixed roles assigned in the game. Some learn by sampling previous play of a
	finite number of other individuals in the same role. We analyze population dynamics under optimal boundedly
	rational behavior (in the sense of Schlag, 1998c). We find that long run play is close to the Nash equilibrium
	(when few individuals receive information) if and only if the sample size is greater than one. 
Length: pages
Creation-Date: 
Revision-Date: 1998-03
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:427
File-URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb427.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 2765209 bytes