Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: An Experimental Bribery Game
Author-Name: Abbink, Klaus
Author-Name: Bernd Irlenbusch
Author-Name: Elke Renner
Author-Postal: Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch
	Laboratorium f|r experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
	Uni Bonn
	Adenauerallee 24-42
	53113 Bonn
	Germany
	phone: 49-228-73-9192 / 9196
	fax: 49-228-73-9193
	abbink@lab.econ1.uni-bonn.de
	bi@uni-bonn.de
	Elke Renner
	Lehrstuhl f|r Organisationstheorie
	Otto-Beisheim-Hochschule (WHU)
	Burgplatz 2
	56179 Vallendar
	Germany
Author-Homepage: 
Classification-JEL: C91,D62,D72,D73,K42
Keywords: Corruption, experiments, reciprocity, fairness, repeated games
Abstract: Essential characteristics of corruption are 
	(1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, 
	(2) negative welfare effects, and 
	(3) high penalties when discovered. 
	We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment. 
	In a two-player game reciprocation is economically 
	inefficient through negative externalities. 
	A control treatment without externalities is also conducted. In a third, 
	so-called sudden death treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of
	 exclusion from the experiment without payment. 
	The results show that reciprocity establishes  
	bribery relationships, where negative externalities have no apparent effect. 
	The penalty threat significantly reduces corruption, 
	although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.
Length:   pages
Creation-Date: 1999-10
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:459