Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Staff Rotation: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption?
Author-Name: Abbink, Klaus
Author-Postal: Klaus Abbink
	Laboratorium fuer experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
	Uni Bonn
	Adenauerallee 24-42
	53113 Bonn
	Germany
Author-Homepage: 
Classification-JEL: C91,D62,D72,D73,K42
Keywords: Corruption, staff rotation, repeated games, strangers and partners
Abstract: The German federal government intends to introduce regular staff rotation 
	as a precautionary measure against corruption in public administrations. 
	To test the effectiveness of this instrument, we conduct 
	an experiment using the bribery game by Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (1999), 
	in which pairs of potential bribers and public officials are randomly re-matched in every round. 
	The data are compared to the analogous treatment with fixed pairs. 
	The results provide strong evidence for the effectiveness of staff 
	rotation in the experimental environment. The level of bribes as well as the 
	frequency of inefficient decisions caused by bribery are reduced significantly.
Length:   pages
Creation-Date: 1999-10
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:460