Template-Type:ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: The Decision to Seek or to Be Sought
Author-Name: Herreiner, Dorothea K
Author-Postal: Dorothea K. Herreiner
	Economic Theory III
	University of Bonn
	Adenauerallee 24-26
	53113 Bonn
	Germany
Author-Phone: 49 228 73 7994
Author-Homepage: 
Classification-JEL: C78, D40, J64
Keywords: Matching, Search, Decentralized Markets
Abstract: A one-shot market with two sides is considered where everybody
	can be matched with at most one person. Individuals have to find
	trading partners on their own. Whether searching or waiting is an
	optimal strategy is the central question of this paper. In a market
	where searching and waiting are done exclusively by one market side,
	it is more efficient if the long market side searches. In a market
	where on both sides some individuals search and others stay put, there
	are also mixed equilibria which are even more efficient. The matching
	friction due to uncoordinated search by individuals implies that
	larger markets are in general less efficient than a collection of
	smaller markets.
Length:   pages
Creation-Date: 1999-12
Revision-Date: 
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:462