SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 42

Author: Ebert, Udo
Title: A Note on Social Welfare Orderings
Abstract: Recently Gevers [1] explored social welfare orderings which satisfy the strong Pareto principle and an anonymity axiom and which are invariant with respect to almost co-cardinal utility functions. He demonstrated that these orderings can be described by numerical functions which are weighted sums of the well ordered utility vector. The purpose of this note is to prove that Gevers's result can be strengthened substantially. His condition is necessary, but it does not suffice to describe the implications of the axioms. The stronger condition derived in this note can be interpreted in an intuitive manner.
Creation-Date: February 1986
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