SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 140
Author: Zachau, Ulrich
Title: Non-Market Information Exchanges and Efficient Allocations of Information
Abstract: In this paper, I study two models of non-market exchanges of information among a group of people who all
have some valuable private information. The first model is an infinitely repeated game, in which the players
exchange information through noncooperative collusion. I completely characterise the Pareto efficient
allocations of information in this game. The requirement of Pareto efficiency is then used as a refinement of
perfect equilibrium. The second model is a one-period cooperative game with side payments, in which the
players exchange information using binding and enforceable contracts. In this case, there exists a unique optimal
degree of diffusion for the information of all players and a unique distribution of profits in the core.
Creation-Date: December 1987
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