SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 146
Author: Weibull, Jürgen W.
Title: Refinements of Subgame Perfection - Without "Trembles"
Abstract: A notion of structurally consistent equilibrium is developed for games in extensive form. In contrast to
sequential equilibrium and other refinements of Nash equilibrium beyond subgame perfection, its definition does
not involve any continuity condition with respect to perturbations or "trembles". Instead, it combines a form of
structural consistency with a form of sequential rationality. Some general properties of this new equilibrium
concept are examined, and its relation to subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium is studied. It is also shown
how structurally consistent equilibria can be endowed with a certain forward-induction property.
Creation-Date: January 1988
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