SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 156
Author: Gardner, Roy, Molly Morris, and Craig Nelson
Title: Evolutionarily Stable Mating Behavior
Abstract: This paper studies sexual selection from the standpoint of evolutionary game theory. Selection acts on
males alone, and two mating phenotypes are present. Males attract females by signalling; females are then
distributed according to the configuration of signals. Payoffs vary systematically with conditions in the
environment. The model chosen to study such systems is an extensive form game, since no evolutionary stable
strategy need exist for the normal form game. The paper calculates the evolutionary stable strategies for both
monomorphic and dimorphic male populations. Examples of such sexual selection processes are then drawn
from anuran mating systems.
Creation-Date: January 1986
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