SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 156

Author: Gardner, Roy, Molly Morris, and Craig Nelson
Title: Evolutionarily Stable Mating Behavior
Abstract: This paper studies sexual selection from the standpoint of evolutionary game theory. Selection acts on males alone, and two mating phenotypes are present. Males attract females by signalling; females are then distributed according to the configuration of signals. Payoffs vary systematically with conditions in the environment. The model chosen to study such systems is an extensive form game, since no evolutionary stable strategy need exist for the normal form game. The paper calculates the evolutionary stable strategies for both monomorphic and dimorphic male populations. Examples of such sexual selection processes are then drawn from anuran mating systems.
Creation-Date: January 1986
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