SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 317
Author: Winter, Eyal, and Myrna Holtz Wooders
Title: On Large Games with Bounded Essential Coalitions
Abstract: In this paper, we show that games with a finite number of types of players and bounded essential (or
effective) coalition sizes are asymptotically equivalent to games derived from markets where all players have the
same, piecewise-linear utility function. In a more general setting, Wooders (1988) shows that large games are
asymptotically equivalent to games derived from markets where all players have the same concave, continuous,
and 1-homogeneous utility function; our contribution herein is showing that, with further restrictions, we obtain
the piecewise linearity. Using the special properties of piecewise linearity of the utility function, we describe
how our result implies that the limit core is a singleton for almost all limiting distributions of player types and
also an asymptotic equivalence of cores and values.
Creation-Date: June 1990
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