SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 332
Author: Le Breton, Michel, and Shlomo Weber
Title: A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple
Games
Abstract: Following the results of Nakamura (1979) and Muto (1984), we derive,
for a given proper voting game G, the bound delta(G) on the size of the
space of alternatives, which guarantees that the core constitutes a von
Neumann-Morgenstern solution for any profile of voters' preferences. In
particular, we show that the space of alternatives consists of more than
two elements, then, in general, the core is not a von Neumann-Morgenstern
solution.
Keywords:
JEL-Classification-Number:
Creation-Date: January 1991
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