SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 332

Author: Le Breton, Michel, and Shlomo Weber
Title: A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games
Abstract: Following the results of Nakamura (1979) and Muto (1984), we derive, for a given proper voting game G, the bound delta(G) on the size of the space of alternatives, which guarantees that the core constitutes a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution for any profile of voters' preferences. In particular, we show that the space of alternatives consists of more than two elements, then, in general, the core is not a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution.
Creation-Date: January 1991
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