SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 396
Author: Marin, Dalia, and Monika Schnitzer
Title: Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade
Abstract: A countertrade contract ties an export to an import.
Usually, countertrade is seen as a form of bilateralism and
reciprocity and thus as an inefficient form of international
exchange. In this paper we argue that there are circumstances
where the tying of two technologically unrelated trade flows may
be efficiency enhancing. We show that countertrade can be seen
as an efficient institution that solves moral hazard problems
and restores creditworthiness of countries with large outstanding
debt. We test the implications of our model using a sample of
230 countertrade contracts.
Keywords: Countertrade, double moral hazard problem, sovereign debt,
technology transfer, creditworthiness
JEL-Classification-Number: D23, F13, F34, L14
Creation-Date: December 1993
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