SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 488
Author: Kamecke, Ulrich
Title: The Role of Tying Contracts for the Optimal Marketing of Durable
Abstract: Tying contracts are well-known for their anti-competitive potential.
This paper questions their negative image by showing that tying contracts
can be necessary to implement price signals which overcome problems of
asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable product.
The argument is applied to two antitrust cases against tying arrangements,
the German Meto case and the US American SCM case.
Keywords: Tying contracts, price signals, antitrust policy
JEL-Classification-Number: L15, L42
Creation-Date: August 1995
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