SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 519
Author: Will, Heide C. U.
Title: Incentives for Information Acquisition in Firms
Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of information acquisition in the
light of two different organisational structures in various competitive
settings. While the intuitive expectation that growing uncertainty raises
the incentives to gather information can be confirmed, a changing
organisational structure may also create a comparative tradeoff. A move from
nonintegration to integration reflects less competition which tends to make
information less valuable. Simultaneously, however, the decision power
becomes more concentrated, implying that information is potentially more
important. We analyse the interdependencies among organisational,
informational and market structures and their impact on the relative
incentives for information acquisition.
Keywords: information, organisational structure, Cournot oligopoly, product
differentiation
JEL-Classification-Number: D23, D43, L11, L15
Creation-Date: February 1996
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