SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 526

Author: Checchi, Daniele, and Giacomo Corneo
Title: Social Custom and Strategic Effects in Trade Union Membership: Italy 1951-1993
Abstract: We present a theoretical model in which union membership is determined by social custom and strategic effects. In the first stage, union leaders exert effort in order to propagate the union's values; in the second stage, the workers decide whether to join the union; finally, the wage is negotiated by the management and the union. In equilibrium, the union density increases with the strength of societal values of solidarity and with the size of the available surplus. The model is tested on aggregate Italian data for the period 1951-93. Cointegration analysis and the estimation of a short-run adjustment model provide empirical support to the theoretical model. Both social custom and strategic effects appear to be good explanatory factors of the long cycle characterising Italian unionism in the post-war period.
Keywords: Trade Union, Social Status, Signaling
JEL-Classification-Number: J50, J51
Creation-Date: June 1996
Unfortunately this paper is not available online. Please contact us to order a hardcopy.

SFB 303 Homepage

05.05.1998, Webmaster