SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 555

Author: Marjit, Sugata, Meenakshi Rajeev, and Diganta Mukherjee
Title: Incomplete Information as a Deterrent to Corruption
Abstract: This paper considers an incomplete information model where a supervisor is entrusted with the job of supervising a number of potentially corrupt agents of different types and the type of an individual agent may not be known to the supervisor. The paper shows how lack of complete information available to the law enforcing agent can help to prevent crime at least to a limited extent by making rewards and penalties more effective.
JEL-Classification-Number: D73, H11, K24
Creation-Date: June 1997
Unfortunately this paper is not available online. Please contact us to order a hardcopy.

SFB 303 Homepage

05.05.1998, Webmaster