SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 105

Author: Uhlich, Gerald R.
Title: An Area Theory for Experimental Two-Person Characteristic Function Games
Abstract: There are many theories of two-person bargaining games, but most of them do not seem to have much relevance for the explanation of laboratory experiments. This may be due to the fact, that most of the theories are normative rather than descriptive. Thousands of plays of different three-person games in characteristic function form have been evaluated at the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics. Some of the theoretical questions posed by this body of data already arise in two-person games. The experimental literature on two-person games does not offer a well supported descriptive theory.

Since no experimental data were available, it was necessary to conduct an experiment. The aim of this paper is to
Creation-Date: November 1988
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