SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 126
Author: Rockenbach, Bettina, and Gerald R. Uhlich
Title: The Negotiation Agreement Area
"An Experimental Analysis of Two-PersonCharacteristic Function
Abstract: The aim of this paper is an examination and an extension of the NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT AREA
(NAA) introduced by UHLICH (1988). This descriptive area theory for experimental two-person characteristic
function games was introduced in the light of two pilot experiments, conducted at the Bonn Laboratory of
Experimental Economics. In comparison to normative theories, the NAA wa the most successful theory with
respect to predictive power. Our aim is to test the predictive power of the NAA in an ex post analysis. In this
paper a generalization of the NAA to games with a negative threat point will be presented and the NAA will be
compared with other theories in the light of our data base, consisting of six sessions of laboratory experiments.
Moreover, we shall introduce a general area theory for two-person characteristic function games with a positive
coalition value. After discussing the NAA as a predictive theory for the outcomes of negotiation, we shall give
insights in the opening demands of negotiators, called the tactical aspirations levels. We shall show that the
tactical aspiration levels reflect the differences of power of the players. The tactical aspiration levels depend on
the type of game under consideration.
Creation-Date: October 1989
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