SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 126

Author: Rockenbach, Bettina, and Gerald R. Uhlich
Title: The Negotiation Agreement Area
"An Experimental Analysis of Two-PersonCharacteristic Function Games"
Abstract: The aim of this paper is an examination and an extension of the NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT AREA (NAA) introduced by UHLICH (1988). This descriptive area theory for experimental two-person characteristic function games was introduced in the light of two pilot experiments, conducted at the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics. In comparison to normative theories, the NAA wa the most successful theory with respect to predictive power. Our aim is to test the predictive power of the NAA in an ex post analysis. In this paper a generalization of the NAA to games with a negative threat point will be presented and the NAA will be compared with other theories in the light of our data base, consisting of six sessions of laboratory experiments. Moreover, we shall introduce a general area theory for two-person characteristic function games with a positive coalition value. After discussing the NAA as a predictive theory for the outcomes of negotiation, we shall give insights in the opening demands of negotiators, called the tactical aspirations levels. We shall show that the tactical aspiration levels reflect the differences of power of the players. The tactical aspiration levels depend on the type of game under consideration.
Creation-Date: October 1989
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