SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 149
Author: Winter, Eyal, and Myrna Holtz Wooders
Title: An Axiomatization of the Core for Finite and Continuum Games
Abstract: In this paper, we provide an axiomatization of the core of a game, where the class of games considered
includes both finite games and continuum games with finite coalitions. Our axiomatization extends those of
Peleg (1985, 1986), to the class of continuum games introduced by Kaneko-Wooders (1985, 1986a), and further
studied and applied to large economies in Hammond-Kaneko-Wooders (1989) and Kaneko-Wooders (1989).The
invariance of our axiomatization between finite and continuum games reflects the invariance of the concept of
the player between both models of games. In a finite model, no matter how large the total player sets, two
players can form a coalition. In contrast, in the continuum model of Dubey-Neyman (1984) with only coalitions
containing nonnegligible percentages of the total player sets, two players (or indeed, any finite number of
players) are completely ineffectual.
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Creation-Date: June 1990
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