SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B-154
Author: Moldovanu, Benny
Title: Sequential Bargaining, Cooperative Games, and Coalition-Proofness
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to establish several links between two
seemingly different game-theoretic approaches to the problem of coalition
formation and payoff division. The two approaches are the so called
"cooperative" and "noncooperative", and the links are created at the levels
of the modelling, the solution concept and the results. We study a
noncooperative, sequential bargaining game based on a game in characteristic
function form without side payments, and relate payoffs in coalition-proof
Nash equilibria of the extensive form game with special allocations which
may be in the core of the underlying game or may display some consistency
with regard to outside options. Balancedness (in the sense of Scarf) plays
an important role. Three-person games are fully analyzed, and we discuss
possible generalizations.
Keywords:
JEL-Classification-Number:
Creation-Date: June 1990
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