SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 158

Author: Mitzkewitz, Michael
Title: Signaling and Equilibrium Selection - Part I: Preliminaries and Generic Games
Abstract: This paper is the first part of a study that works out the Harsanyi-Selten solution for a complete class of simple signaling games, applies this solution to different economic models and compares the solution with the results of refinement concepts. In this first part we motivate our project, give an introduction into Harsanyi's and Selten's general theory of equilibrium selection and compute the solution for the generic signaling games of the class we will consider.
JEL-Classification-Number: 022, 026
Creation-Date: July 1990
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