SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 158
Author: Mitzkewitz, Michael
Title: Signaling and Equilibrium Selection - Part I: Preliminaries and Generic
Abstract: This paper is the first part of a study that works out the
Harsanyi-Selten solution for a complete class of simple signaling games,
applies this solution to different economic models and compares the solution
with the results of refinement concepts. In this first part we motivate our
project, give an introduction into Harsanyi's and Selten's general theory of
equilibrium selection and compute the solution for the generic signaling
games of the class we will consider.
JEL-Classification-Number: 022, 026
Creation-Date: July 1990
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