SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B-174
Author:
Moldovanu, Benny, and Eyal Winter
Title: Order Independent Equilibrium Payoffs
Abstract: We propose the study of order-independent equilibrium payoffs in
sequential models where the underlying situation can be considered symmetric
with respect to the identity of "first movers". We exemplify our ideas using
a sequential bargaining game based on an N-person game in coalitional form,
without transferable utility. We study strategies which remain in
equilibrium, and lead always to the same payoffs, no matter what the exact
order of the "first" movers is. Our intuition is that such analysis should
link the noncooperative approach to the cooperative one, where exact
procedures do not matter. Here we relate payoffs in order-independent
equilibria to payoffs in the core of the underlying game.
Keywords:
JEL-Classification-Number:
Creation-Date: December 1990
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