Moldovanu, Benny, and Eyal Winter
Title: Order Independent Equilibrium Payoffs
Abstract: We propose the study of order-independent equilibrium payoffs in sequential models where the underlying situation can be considered symmetric with respect to the identity of "first movers". We exemplify our ideas using a sequential bargaining game based on an N-person game in coalitional form, without transferable utility. We study strategies which remain in equilibrium, and lead always to the same payoffs, no matter what the exact order of the "first" movers is. Our intuition is that such analysis should link the noncooperative approach to the cooperative one, where exact procedures do not matter. Here we relate payoffs in order-independent equilibria to payoffs in the core of the underlying game.
Creation-Date: December 1990
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