**Author**:
Selten, Reinhard**Title**: An Axiomatic Theory of a Risk Dominance Measure for Bipolar Games
with Linear Incentives **Abstract**: Bipolar games are normal form games with two pure strategies for each
player and with two strict equilibrium points without common equilibrium
strategies. A normal form game has linear incentives, if for each player
the difference between the payoffs for any two pure strategies depends
linearly on the probabilities in the mixed strategies used by the other
players. A measure of risk dominance between two strice equilibrium points
of a bipolar game with linear incentives is characterized by eleven axioms.
The measure has the purpose to serve as a structural element of a not yet
fully specified equilibrium selection theory for games with linear
incentives. This class contains all two-person games but also those n-person
games which arise from two-person normal forms with incomplete information
by looking at the types as separate players. The measure is a weighted
average of deviation loss ratio logarithms with weights derived from
influence matrices whose elements describe one player´s relative influence
on another player's payoff difference.**Keywords**:
**JEL-Classification-Number**: **Creation-Date**: August 1993

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