SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 278
Author: Gardner, Roy, Michael R. Moore, and James M. Walker
Title: Racing for the Water: Laboratory Evidence on Subgame Perfection
Abstract: This paper examines strategic behaviour in the context of a
dynamic common-pool resource game with a unique symmetric subgame
equilibrium. Solving the model for its optimal solution and its subgame
perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in
laboratory experiments. Baseline experiments, which portray a "rule of
capture" for establishing ownership with group size equal to 10, achieve
an average efficiency of 30%. Experiments that restrict entry, with
group size equal to 5, increase average efficiency to 44%. Experiments
applying a stock quota show more marked improvement in efficiency,
averaging 54%. The stock quota come closet to producing data consistent
with subgame perfection.
Keywords:
JEL-Classification-Number:
Creation-Date: February 1994
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