SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 305
Author: Balkenborg, Dieter
Title: Evolutionary Stability, Strictness and Repeated Games with Common
Abstract: Strict equilibrium sets generalize the concept of strict equilibrium
points to sets. They coincide with the evolutionary stable sets in
asymmetric games. In this paper we study strict equilibrium sets of repeated
games. For finitely repeated common interest games we show: There is a fixed
upper bound on the number of inefficient outcomes that can occur along the
outcome paths induced by strict equilibrium sets of the repeated game. This
bound depends only on the stage game and is independent of the number of
repetitions. But we also show that common interest games are generically the
only games with the property that a strict equilibrium set exists in
arbitrarily long finite repetitions.
Creation-Date: January 1995
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