SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 329
Author: Kirchkamp, Oliver
Title: Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs How spatial evolution leads to enequality
Abstract: We present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are permanently matched. These players learn from the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by their partners. Thus, several features of spatial evolution are captured while nonlinearities that would arise with more complex networks are avoided. We can identify characteristics of evolution in networks such as stable cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games and long run exploitation among different strategies. We furthermore discuss evolution of repeated game strategies in this framework comparing synchonous models with asynchronous ones.
Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Networks
JEL-Classification-Number: C72, D62, D63, R12, R13
Creation-Date: October 1995
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