SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 334
Author: Selten, Reinhard, and Myrna Holtz Wooders
Title: Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Examples
Abstract: We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advatange of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players may be repeated infintely often. This feature makes a cyclic game essentially finite, although it may have an infinite number of players and may be unending. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We also provide an existence of equilibrium theorem and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry.
Keywords: Cyclic Games
Creation-Date: December 1995
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