SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 373
Author: Kuon, Bettina
Title: Spontaneous Behavior and Experienced Players' Strategies in Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Abstract: Two players bargain over the allocation of a sum of money. They are only incompletely informed about the opponent's alternative in case of conflict. The paper investigates two different experimental approaches: the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment and the strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects. The synopsis of these two experimental approaches is a novelty in experimental research and it provides a vivid picture of the boundedly rational behavior in the bargaining game. The paper's main focus is on the agreement outcomes, the average payoffs, the concession behavior and the individual adaption to experience.
Keywords: Bargaining, Incomplete Information, Experiments, Bounded Rationality
JEL-Classification-Number: C90, C92, C72, C78
Creation-Date: May 1996
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