SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 388

Author: Monderer, Dov, Shlomit Hon-Snir, and Aner Sela
Title: A Learning Approach to Auctions
Abstract: We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bid are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.
Keywords: Learning process, fictitious play, first-price auction.
JEL-Classification-Number: C72, C73, D83, D44
Creation-Date: October 1996
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