SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 409

Author: Ritzberger, Klaus
Title: Perfect Recall
Abstract: This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed entirely in terms of the choice partition without any reference to any information sets. When information sets are taken into account it is decomposable into an ordering of information sets, a memory requirement, and the player's inability to deduce extra information from her own past choices. A conclusion of this decomposition is that perfect recall is not necessarily an implication of rationality, because its first part is not implied by rationality. But if information sets are partially ordered, then it can be argued, that perfect recall indeed follows from rationality. And this condition is weaker than conditions to the same effect n the previous literature.
Keywords: Extensive Form Games, Perfect Recall
JEL-Classification-Number: C72
Creation-Date: June 1997
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