Topics in Microeconomic Theory: Behavioral Mechanism Design

The course takes place:

Wed: 14-16 (s.t.), Seminarraum in der Lennestr. 37, 2 Stock.

We discuss models of mechanism or contract design when agents have non-standard preferences such as loss aversion, limited self-control, social preferences, utility from anticipation, etc.

· Köszegi, B.: Behavioral Contract Theory. pdf

· Amador, M., Werning, I, and Angeletos, G.-M.: Commitment vs. Flexibility. pdf

· Bierbrauer, F., Ockenfels, A., Pollak, A., and Rückert, D.: Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences. pdf

· Bierbrauer, F., Netzer, N.: Mechanism Design and Intentions. pdf

· Bond, P., Sigurdsson, G.: Commitment Contracts. pdf

· Caplin, A., Eliaz, K.: AIDS Policy and Psychology: a Mechanism Design Approach. pdf

· Caplin, A. Leahy, J.: Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings. pdf

· Carbajal, J. C., Ely J. C.: A Model of Price Discrimination under Loss Aversion and State-Contingent Reference Points. pdf

· Crawford, V. P., Kugler, T., Neeman, Z., and Pauzner, A.: Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations. pdf

· de Clippel, G.: Behavioral Implementation. pdf

· de la Rosa, L. E.: Overconfidence and Moral Hazard. pdf

· Desiraju, R, Sappington, D. E. M.: Equity and Adverse Selection. pdf

· Eliaz, K.: Fault Tolerant Implementation. pdf

· Ely, J., Frankel, A., and Kamenica, E.: Suspense and Surprise. pdf

· Estebana, S., Miyagawac, E., and Shum, M.: Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences. pdf

· Galperti, S.: Optimal Screening of Time Inconsistency. pdf

· Grubb, M. D.: Selling to Overconfident Consumers. pdf

· Heidhues, P., Köszegi, B. Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market. pdf

· Jehiel, P., Laurent Lamy, L.: Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used? pdf

· O’Donoghue, T., Rabin, M.: Incentives and Self-Control. pdf

· Salant, Y., Siegel, R.: Contracts with Framing. pdf

· von Thadden, E.-L., Zhao, X.: Incentives for Unaware Agents, pdf