SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A - 606

Author: Oechssler, Jörg, and Frank Riedel
Title: Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy
Abstract: The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this unsatisfying restriction is unnecessary. We specify a simple condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for the case of infinte strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide new conditions for the stability of rest points and show that even strict equilibria may be unstable. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, linear-quadratic games, the harvest preemption game, and games with mixed strategies.
Keywords: replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability, continuous strategy spaces
JEL-Classification-Number: C70, C72
Creation-Date: November 1999
URL: ../1999/a/bonnsfa606.pdf

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