SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 379
Author: Kirchkamp, Oliver
Title: Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies
Abstract: We study a model of local evolution. Players are located on a network and play games agains their neighbors.
Players are characterized by three properties: (1) The stage game strategies they use agains their neighbors. (2)
The repeated game strategy that determines the former. (3) A learning rule that selects the repeated game
strategy, on the basis of the player's own and the neighbors' payoff and repeated game
The dynamics that specifies learning rules is given exogenously. Players sample their neighbors' learning rules
and their respective payoff. Then they construct a model that related parameters of the learning rules to payoffs.
Given this model they choose an optimal learning rule.
We find that under this dynamics learning rules emerge in the long run which behave deterministically but
which are asymmetric in the sense that while learning they put more weight on the learning players experience
then on the observed players one. Nevertheless stage game behavior under these learning rules is similar to
behavior using symmetric learning rules.
Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Networks.
JEL-Classification-Number: C63, C72, D62, D63, D73, D83, R12, R13
Creation-Date: May 1996
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