SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 423
Author: Sela, Aner, and Dorothea K. Herreiner
Title: Fictitious Play in Coordination Games
Abstract: We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinae (almost surely) against their own type as well as against players with bounded recall. This implies that a FP players's realized average utility is (almost surely) at least as large as his minmax payoffs in 2x2 coordination games.
Keywords: Learning, Fictitious Play, Coordination Games, Pure Coordination Games
JEL-Classification-Number: C72, D83
Creation-Date: December 1997
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