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Topics in Microeconomic Theory:
Bayesian Persuasion and Disclosure The course takes place: Tue: 14-16,
room 0.017. (I intend to move the time to Wed, 14-16.) We
discuss models of Bayesian persuasion and disclosure of information in games. ·
Bergemann,
D., Bonatti, A. (2014): Selling cookies. pdf ·
Bergemann,
D., Bonatti, A., Smolin, A. (2014): Selling experiments: Menu price of
information. pdf ·
Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., Morris,.
S. (2014): The limits of price discrimination. pdf ·
Bergemann, D., Pesendorfer, M. (2007): Information structures in optimal auctions. pdf ·
Ely,
J. (2013): Beeps. pdf ·
Ely.
J., Frankel, A., Kamenica, E. (2014): Suspense and
surprise. pdf ·
Gentzkow. M,
Kamenica, E. (2012): Competition in persuasion. pdf ·
Jehiel, P. (2014): On transparency in organizations. pdf ·
Johnson,
J., Myatt, D.P. (2006): On the simple economics of
advertising, marketing, and product design. pdf ·
Kamenica, E., Gentzkow, M. (2011): Bayesian Perusasion. pdf ·
Rayo, L., Segal, I. (2010): Optimal information disclosure. pdf |
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