Topics in Microeconomic Theory: Bayesian Persuasion and Disclosure



The course takes place:

Tue: 14-16, room 0.017. (I intend to move the time to Wed, 14-16.)


We discuss models of Bayesian persuasion and disclosure of information in games.


        Bergemann, D., Bonatti, A. (2014): Selling cookies. pdf

        Bergemann, D., Bonatti, A., Smolin, A. (2014): Selling experiments: Menu price of information. pdf

        Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., Morris,. S. (2014): The limits of price discrimination. pdf

        Bergemann, D., Pesendorfer, M. (2007): Information structures in optimal auctions. pdf

        Ely, J. (2013): Beeps. pdf

        Ely. J., Frankel, A., Kamenica, E. (2014): Suspense and surprise. pdf

        Gentzkow. M, Kamenica, E. (2012): Competition in persuasion. pdf

        Jehiel, P. (2014): On transparency in organizations. pdf

        Johnson, J., Myatt, D.P. (2006): On the simple economics of advertising, marketing, and product design. pdf

        Kamenica, E., Gentzkow, M. (2011): Bayesian Perusasion. pdf

        Rayo, L., Segal, I. (2010): Optimal information disclosure. pdf