Prof. Dr. Daniel Krähmer

Universität Bonn

Institut für Mikroökonomik

Adenauer Allee 24-42

D-53113 Bonn, Germany

++49-(0)228-736147

kraehmer[at]hcm.uni-bonn.de

Büro: Lennestr. 43, 2. OG

Sprechstunde: nach Vereinbarung

CV

Working papers

• Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy, with Roland Strausz.

Publications

• Biased Beliefs in Search Markets, with Tobias Gamp.
  American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15, 2023, 414-464.

• Optimal Non-linear Pricing with Data-sensitive Consumers, with Roland Strausz.
  American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15, 2023, 80-108.

• Competition in Search Markets with Naïve Consumers, with Tobias Gamp.
  Rand Journal of Economics, 53, 2022, 356-385.

• Information Design and Strategic Communication.
  American Economic Review: Insights, 3, 2021, 51-66.

• Information Disclosure and Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design.
  Journal of Economic Theory, 107, 2020, 105020.

• Sequential versus Static Screening – An Equivalence Result, with Roland Strausz.
  Games and Economic Behavior 106, 2017, 317-328.

• The Optimal Allocation of Decision and Exit Rights in Organizations, with Helmut Bester.
  Rand Journal of Economics 48, 2017, 309-334.

• Optimal Sequential Delegation, with Eugen Kovac.
  Journal of Economic Theory 163, 2016, 849-888.

• Optimality of Sequential Screening with Multiple Units and Ex Post Participation Constraints, with Roland Strausz.
  Economics Letters 142, 2016, 64-68.

• Ex Post Information Rents in Sequential Screening, with Roland Strausz.
  Games and Economic Behavior 90, 2015, 257-273.

• Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights, with Roland Strausz.
  Review of Economic Studies 82, 2015, 762-790.

• When are Signals Complements or Substitutes?, with Tilman Börgers and Angel Hernando-Veciana.
  Journal of Economic Theory 148, 2013, 165-195.

• Anticipated Regret as an Explanation of Uncertainty Aversion, with Rebecca Stone.
  Economic Theory 25, 2013, 709-728.

• Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information, with Helmut Bester.
  Journal of Economic Theory 147, 2012, 1947-1968.

• Optimal Auction Design with Endogenously Correlated Buyer Types.
  Journal of Economic Theory 147, 2012, 118-141.

• Comment on Correlated information, mechanism design and information, with Roland Strausz.
  Journal of Economic Theory 146, 2011, 2159-2164.

• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning, with Roland Strausz.
  Review of Economic Studies 78, 2011, 1015-1041.

• Delegation and Incentives, with Helmut Bester.
  Rand Journal of Economics 39, 2008, 664-682.

• Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening, with Roland Strausz.
  B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 8:1 (Topics), Article 25, 2008.

• Equilibrium Learning in Simple Contests.
  Games and Economic Behavior 59, 2007,105-131.

• VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities, with Roland Strausz.
  Economics Letters 94 (2), 2007, 192-196.

• Advertising and Conspicuous Consumption.
  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162 (4), 2006, 661-682.

• Message-Contingent Delegation.
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 60 (4), 2006, 490-506.

• Entry and Experimentation in Oligopolistic Markets for Experience Goods.
  International Journal of Industrial Organization 21 (8), 2003 1201-1213.

Book chapter and reviews

• ``Dynamic Mechanism Design'', with Roland Strausz. Chapter 11 in: Tilman Börgers: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015.

• Comment on ``Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form Contracts''
  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 167, 2011, 45-48.

• Bacharach, M.: Beyond Individual Choice. Teams and Frames in Game Theory.
  Journal of Economics, 91, 2007, 299-304.